Amid rising nuclear threats due to escalating tensions in Ukraine and the Middle East, both regions need a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in Central and Eastern Europe more than ever. It could be the key to ensuring peace and stability on the continent and setting an example for the rest of the world.
Although most nuclear weapons on European soil are stored in Western countries, concerns arise from the potential for countries near the conflict in Ukraine to host such weapons in the near future. Besides the militarisation of Kaliningrad, Russia has already moved tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. In reply, Polish president, Andrzej Duda, claims Polandis ready to host NATO’s nuclear weapons to reinforce its eastern flank.
Contrary to the popular narrative of nuclear deterrence, the presence of nuclear weapons has failed to prevent numerous conflicts since the end of the Second World War. It is only a matter of time before their use could result in catastrophic consequences, underscoring the urgent need for bold, proactive peace initiatives. NWFZs represent a necessary next step in preventing the use of such weapons.
Establishing an NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe would serve as an obstacle to further nuclear escalation and a crucial safeguard for regional stability. It can begin as a regional initiative with coordinated support from Brussels and the United Nations, putting the region and the European Union at the forefront of the global struggle for peace, nuclear non-proliferation, and disarmament. The EU must seize this critical moment and embrace the possibility of decisive and visionary leadership while securing stability in Europe.
Additionally, 15 years have passed since the establishment of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in 2009. The CANWFZ is the latest NWFZ in the world, and the first located entirely within the northern hemisphere. It is a positive example of a complex region that previously housed Soviet nuclear weapons and is in proximity to six nuclear weapon states, reinforcing non-proliferation norms and promoting stability and cooperation. That success should serve as an example for Europe to follow.
There are already five such zones in total – in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia – but none in Europe, even though Europe is the origin of the concept. The first major proposal, known as the Rapacki Plan, was introduced by Poland in 1958, with similar initiatives also proposed by the Soviet Union, Sweden, Finland, Romania, and Bulgaria.
A NWFZ in Europe, following in the footsteps of existing zones, would be a designated area where the development, possession, and deployment of nuclear weapons are strictly prohibited. It would ideally include nations from Central and Eastern Europe, stretching from Poland, the Czech Republic, and Austria to the border with Russia. That would see the NWFZ positioned strategically between nuclear weapon states: France and the UK to the west and Russia to the east.
Determining the exact boundaries and scope of this zone would require careful analysis and negotiation. If Europe gets it right, such a zone could offer a framework for addressing the Russo-Ukrainian conflict by establishing a neutral buffer that promotes stability and dialogue.
Historical attempts to create a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe were hindered by Cold War rivalries. Today, a similar initiative could mitigate the risk of nuclear escalation in the region and serve as a basis for broader peace negotiations globally, including in the Middle East.
Recently, during remarks at an NWFZ workshop, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, emphasisedthat in the current security climate, “the prospects of the use of nuclear weapons, be it deliberate, by mistake or miscalculation, have become unacceptably high,” and highlighted renewed interest in preserving and strengthening existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, as well as creating new ones, to combat regional proliferation and nuclear weapon use.
In the meeting in Astana, Nakamitsu also highlighted Kazakhstan’s leadership in establishing the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, which exemplifies how such zones, covering over half of the world’s land mass, enhance both global and regional peace and security, reflecting the widespread belief that non-possession of nuclear weapons serves states’ security interests.
Along with the establishment of NWFZ in Europe, the EU should also take a leading role in addressing the reservations to existing protocols by nuclear-armed states, such as the lack of credible and legally binding security guarantees, and inadequate verification mechanisms. Such challenges are limiting the commitment to security assurances, eventually undermining the effectiveness of the Zones. This would ensure a European NWFZ is not just an idea on paper, but a practical and effective reality.
Existing NWFZs highlight the complexities of achieving an effective disarmament framework. That should not deter us. Rather, it presents an opportunity. The current conflict on European soil should serve as a catalyst for dialogue and cooperation among nuclear powers, compelling them to agree on establishing an NWFZ and aid in achieving security guarantees from atomic weapons states and stronger nuclear protocols. Europe has the chance to lead by a positive example and, if achieved, it would pave the way for a more stable and secure future for the region. Eventually, Europe’s successes could be replicated in other conflict-prone areas in the future.
Follow the comments:
|
