Preferential market access without enforceable...

Preferential market access without enforceable rights conditions is an outdated practice which strengthens the nefarious mala fide agendas of hybrid regimes and regresses rights under the guise of development.

The European Union’s Generalized Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+), designed as a trade incentive to promote sustainable development and human rights in vulnerable economies, stands at a crossroads. While it has undeniably boosted exports for countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan and beyond, its failure to meaningfully enforce human rights and governance conditionality has transformed it into a paradoxical tool: one that subsidizes authoritarianism under the guise of economic uplift. This contradiction is not merely theoretical but quantifiable. It has been rooted in trade statistics that soar alongside stagnant—or worsening—democratic indices. Consider Pakistan, the largest GSP+ beneficiary since 2014, whose exports to the EU surged by 108% to €14.85 billion by 2022. Yet, the country has been scoring low on all the indicators and rankings-from freedom of expression to democratic governance and human rights to gender equality. To quote, the European Union’s own 2023 monitoring report acknowledges “serious concerns” over Pakistan’s rights record but stops short of suspending privileges, revealing a structural flaw in the standardized schemes of development projects of the ‘EU Mission in Pakistan’.

This pattern repeats across GSP+ beneficiaries. Sri Lanka, reinstated into the scheme in 2017, saw its exports to the EU rebound to €3.8 billion by 2023, yet its government has intensified crackdowns on civil liberties, including the 2024 Online Safety Act criminalizing dissent and persistent use of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act to silence critics. The EU’s biennial reviews note “progress” in these countries, but such assessments often rely on superficial legislative tweaks rather than tangible reforms. For instance, Pakistan’s Prevention on Electronic Crime Act, Pakistan Media Development Authority or amendment to its cybersecurity monitoring laws—touted as a step forward—hammered the democratic and development processes in the country at large. Despite the EU’s repeated requests that the country address these loopholes,they have become routine, given that no one is there to stop them. This raises an important question: When does the EU’s patience with incrementalism become complicity in repression?

Can the mechanism or outcomes scale be upgraded in response to the hybrid nature of authoritarians in the developing world?

Of course we are not here to dictate to the policymakers regarding their policies or prosperous plans, but we can look into the vision of the beneficiaries. The core issue lies in the GSP+ framework’s design. While a candidate country must ratify several global conventions on human rights, labor environment and governance to obtain or maintain the status, compliance is self-reported and monitored through opaque, biennial dialogues. There are no automatic triggers for suspension, no quantitative benchmarks for “effective implementation,” and no penalties for backsliding beyond vague warnings. Let’s say, the EU grants €100 million to Pakistan for improving the quality of life and other factors in its tribal belt bordering Afghanistan, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, the average living conditions in these regions are still of a typical stone-age. Just to portray a bigger picture, few women activists or journalists are sponsored from these regions to show that the state is keen to develop these regions. Those who criticize the policies or tend to portray the truth are jailed for “anti-state” social media posts. Similarly, Sri Lanka’s GSP+ status survived its 2022 economic collapse and the subsequent violent crackdown on protests, with the EU merely urging “restraint” while trade flows continued uninterrupted. The geopolitical calculus behind this leniency is unmistakable. The EU relies on GSP+ countries as strategic trade partners and buffers against Chinese influence. Pakistan, for example, is a pivotal actor in Afghanistan’s stability and a key textiles supplier, with 80% of its EU-bound exports under GSP+ being garments. Yet this realpolitik undermines the bloc’s credibility as a normative power. By prioritizing market access over rights enforcement, the EU inadvertently entrenches hybrid regimes, namelygovernments that mimic democratic institutions while hollowing them out. Pakistan’s 2024 elections, marred by military interference and mass disqualification of opposition candidates, exemplify this duality and raises another query: Can the EU claim to champion democratic values when its trade policies reward such manipulation?

Reforming GSP+ requires dismantling its current architecture of impunity. The Union must replace subjective “dialogue” with transparent, metrics-driven assessments. One of the most promising approaches in this regard could be the tying of tariff benefits to annual improvements in Freedom House scores or reductions in child labor rates, with third-party audits by various global bodies. Second, automatic suspension mechanisms should activate when predefined red lines are crossed—such as the jailing of journalists, systemic gender violence, or forced labor exceeding five percent of a sector’s workforce. Third, the EU must empower civil society within beneficiary states through direct funding and inclusion in monitoring, rather than relying soley on government self-reporting. Pakistan’s National Commission on Human Rights, for instance, remains underfunded and politically neutered, unable to investigate abuses without military approval.

Ultimately, the GSP+ regime reflects a deeper tension in EU foreign policy,namely the clash between ethical aspirations and economic pragmatism. While the scheme’s economic benefits are undeniable—Pakistan’s textile sector alone employs 15 million workers—its failure to uplift governance perpetuates cycles of poverty and repression. The EU’s 2024 extension of GSP+ until 2027, without substantive reform, suggests complacency. However, for every hurdle there is a solution and in this case it lies not in abandoning the scheme but recalibrating it. Imagine a GSP+ where tariff rates fluctuate with a country’s democracy index, or where export quotas are tied to girls’ school enrollment rates. Such innovative conditionality could align trade incentives with tangible rights progress, transforming GSP+ from a blunt economic tool into a catalyst for genuine change.

The stakes extend beyond the realm of trade and the moment demands courage. By tolerating authoritarianism, the EU normalizes a global order where economic might trumps democratic integrity. Will it continue to prioritize short-term trade gains, or will it redefine conditionality to mean measurable, enforceable progress? The answer will determine whether GSP+ remains a footnote in authoritarian playbooks—or becomes a blueprint for equitable globalization.