The Bombing of Dubai

The world has been shocked twice. First, when the US and Israel launched open war on 28th February by striking infrastructure across Iran. And, then, when Iran responded, targeting American military installations and those of its allies across the Middle East. Not limited to Iran and its neighbours, it has affected countries traditionally regarded as regional havens of stability such as Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Even the world-renowned icons of Dubai, its International Airport, and the Burj Al Arab were not spared. As dawn broke, they stood as smoking, grim monuments to a spreading regional conflict. Dubai, long presented as an oasis of calm in West Asia, has finally been caught up in the turbulence surrounding it. Responding to a war it did not choose, the UAE has asked its allies for defensive support, foremost among them France.

The question is now how they will choose to respond. For the Quai d’Orsay, the smoke over the Jumeirah coast is not a distant tragedy; it is a direct blow to a cornerstone of French global strategy. France’s position in the Indo-Pacific is unique among European powers. It is a resident power, responsible not only for its strategic interests, but also for protecting 1.6 million citizens across overseas territories such as La Réunion and Mayotte.

Paris and the Gulf: A Strategic Relationship

The UAE serves as the northern anchor of this Indo-Pacific posture. To maintain its status as a regional power, France has built a strategy based on deterrence, capable military forces, and a network of strong allies including Australia, India, and the UAE. Without a stable partner in the Gulf, France’s ability to project influence from the Mediterranean to the shores of New Caledonia would be severely weakened.

At the centre of this relationship stand the French Forces in the UEA. Established in 2009 at the “Camp de la Paix” in Abu Dhabi, the base functions as France’s primary strategic pivot in the region. The BA 104 air base at Al Dhafra, where French Rafale aircraft were scrambled on 28 February to intercept Iranian drones, and the naval installation at Port Zayed, tie French security interests directly to those of the Emirates.

The 2026 strikes have activated the mutual defence clauses of the bilateral partnership, transforming France’s role from that of a “strategic partner” into that of an active security guarantor. The nature of the relationship between Paris and Abu Dhabi has also evolved. What once resembled a primarily transactional “arms-buyer” dynamic has gradually developed into a shared geopolitical outlook. Both countries view the international system through a multipolar lens and remain wary of a world dominated by a simple US-China rivalry.

By defending Dubai and, by extension, other Gulf partners such as Kuwait and Bahrain, which are also linked to France through defence agreements, Paris seeks to preserve the possibility of a “third way”. This would allow middle powers to maintain stability without becoming dependent on the strategic choices of Washington, Beijing, or Tehran. Recent diplomatic statements from partners such as India and the UAE suggest that this approach resonates beyond Europe.

The Rafale Axis and the Indo-Pacific Balance

The bombing of Dubai has accelerated the transformation of what some observers call the “Rafale Axis” into a more concrete security arrangement. This emerging trilateral partnership between France, the UAE, and India is no longer limited to defence cooperation or arms agreements. For Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the stability of the Emirates is also a domestic concern. More than 3.5 million Indian citizens live and work in the UAE, and the Gulf remains crucial to India’s energy supply and remittance flows.

A destabilised Dubai would therefore have direct consequences for the Indian economy. The February 2026 India-France Joint Statement signed in Mumbai elevated the relationship to a “Special Global Strategic Partnership”, envisaging deeper maritime and air coordination to safeguard stability in the Indian Ocean, a scenario that has suddenly become highly relevant. This crisis also reflects a broader transformation of the regional strategic landscape.

The Abraham Accords once promised a new era of cooperation between Israel and several Arab states. Yet, the February escalation has shattered that fragile equilibrium. As the US and Israel engage in a war of attrition with Iran, France and India find themselves acting as reluctant “firefighters,” attempting to contain the conflict. If the Strait of Hormuz remains a combat zone, as Iran’s actions now suggest, the vision of a stable corridor linking the Indo-Pacific and Europe could collapse entirely.

While France has taken the role of military first responder, the EU faces a deeper question about its relevance as a geopolitical actor. Only weeks earlier, the so-called “Mother of All Deals” announced in New Delhi had promised a new era of EU-Indian economic cooperation. Central to this vision was the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, designed to bypass vulnerabilities in traditional shipping routes through the Red Sea. The bombing of Dubai has effectively broken that corridor and shaken confidence in its viability.

Europe’s Strategic Dilemma

The EU, often described as a regulatory superpower, is discovering that trade rules and environmental regulations provide little protection against ballistic missiles targeting key logistical hubs. The immediate consequence is the return of Europe’s energy dilemma. After reducing dependence on Russian gas through the REPowerEU programme, the EU increasingly relied on Gulf liquefied natural gas. With the region now destabilised, the spectre of renewed dependence on Russian energy looms again.

At the same time, Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”, hundreds of ageing tankers operating outside regulatory frameworks, continues to supply crude oil to Asian markets, generating revenues that support Moscow’s war in Ukraine. India has found itself balancing between competing pressures, accepting a temporary sanctions waiver from Washington to purchase Russian oil while simultaneously hosting European leaders for its Republic Day celebrations. The European response to the crisis has exposed significant internal divisions.

In Madrid, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has taken a firm stance, condemning the strikes as violations of international law and refusing the United States access to Spanish military bases. His “No to War” position echoes debates from the Iraq War era and presents Spain as a defender of a more cautious European foreign policy. In contrast, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has signalled a “return to realism,” offering political support for the US-Israeli campaign and arguing that this is “not the moment to lecture our partners.”

A similarly Atlanticist stance has been adopted in the United Kingdom, where Prime Minister Keir Starmer has authorised the use of British bases for defensive operations. France finds itself attempting to balance these positions. While President Emmanuel Macron continues to emphasise European unity in response to global economic pressures, Paris has expressed frustration with Spain’s refusal to facilitate allied logistical operations.

A Choice for Europe

This tension became visible when Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, responding to former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin’s praise of Spain’s stance, remarked pointedly that “Spain does not save Europe’s honour”. Nevertheless, cooperation has not entirely broken down. European leaders have agreed on two joint initiatives: a mission to repatriate European citizens stranded in the region and a naval operation involving France, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Cyprus to ensure maritime security following missile attacks in the eastern Mediterranean.

The “Mother of All Deals” was intended to inaugurate a new era of economic cooperation between Europe and Asia. Instead, it has forced the European Union to confront a fundamental strategic question. The EU must decide whether it can tolerate a multi-speed security policy, where some members take responsibility for protecting trade routes and strategic interests while others retreat into neutrality or whether it intends to act as a unified geopolitical actor.

In an era increasingly defined by hard power, Europe cannot indefinitely rely on economic influence alone. If it fails to reconcile its internal divisions, its geopolitical ambitions may disappear as quickly as the symbols of stability that once defined Dubai. To navigate this new reality, the EU must decide whether it is truly a political union or simply a collection of states with diverging historical instincts.