More right-winged than ever: In the 2024 European election, far-right parties won nearly 180 seats and therefore now represents 25% in the European Parliament. Among them are the German party “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD), the French “Rassemblement National” (RN) and the Polish “Prawo i Sprawiedliwość” (PiS). Meanwhile, on the 22nd March 2024 the three foreign ministers from Germany, France and Poland were celebrating unity of the Weimar Triangle. This contradiction illustrates the growing tension between rising right-wing populist movements and cross border cooperation. How does this intrinsic tension affect the three-nation bloc and what challenges might lie ahead?
The birth of a new coalition in Post Cold-War Europe
The Weimar Triangle was formed in the city of Weimar in 1991 by the German, French and Polish ministers of foreign affairs. Initially, the aim of the Triangle was to support and promote German-Polish reconciliation inspired by the French-German experience, with support from the French side.
The creation of the new alliance was beneficial to all parties: Poland finally had a chance to cooperate more openly with the West and open a path towards a NATO and EU membership. For the newly reunified Germany, it meant better control over the situation on the eastern border and establishing contacts with post-communist countries undergoing systemic transformation. France, as one of the European integration leaders, saw it as an opportunity to play a more prominent role in integrating the countries of the former Eastern Bloc into the Western community.
The key task of the triangle, facilitating Poland’s integration into European structures, has been achieved. However, the triangle has not taken on a prominent role in foreign policy agendas in the last 30 years.
Poland left behind
Cooperation between countries heavily rely on personal relations between the country leaders. While the former German chancellor Olaf Scholz and current president of France, Emmanuel Macron, had personal aversions, the new chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz seems to improve the liaison to his French neighbor.
Three days after the election victory of the Christian Democrats (CDU) in the German federal elections in February, the party leader Merz travelled to France. Afterwards Merz posted a comment on X: “Thank you very much, dear @EmmanuelMacron, for your friendship and your trust in German-French relations.” Thus, a positive vision for the relationship between France and Germany. But while Macron and Merz are posing for videos on Instagram, the Polish minister Donald Tusk is nowhere to be seen.
“The triangle only works if all countries are interested in an equal collaboration”, said a spokesperson of the Polish embassy in Berlin, in response to a question of a participant of the Newsroom Europe Program, in April. An interest the PiS government was missing the last few years. At the same time, Germany and France have worked on bilateral projects - rooting back to the Treaty of Élysée. Their eastern, now willing partner, is left behind.
“The Weimar Triangle should not be further deepened”
According to the Polish embassy in Berlin, one major challenge the triangle faces is the French political instability, including three shifts in the premier office within just one year. With a possible win of the far-right candidate in the upcoming French presidential election in 2027, the French attitude towards the Triangle could switch.
In March 2024, Jordan Bardella, the current president of Rassemblement National, clarified his sceptical attitude towards European cooperation. His party wants to strongly reduce partnerships within the EU. The far-right German AfD politician Siegbert Droese, who has a seat in the European Parliament, shares Bardellas critical view on European cooperation, as he told us: “The Weimar Triangle should not be further deepened. So far, it has not produced any tangible results. Each of the participating countries has its own interests, which should not be diluted by an overarching forum.”
Loop-holes in the Triangle
Yet, it is not only the right-wing parties, but also specific political topics challenging the Triangle these days. Although the Weimar three are considered one of the biggest political and financial supporters of Ukraine, the nations sometimes struggle at finding a common ground. When Scholz, Macron and Tusk met in March 2024, the German chancellor said: “The Weimar Triangle […] is an important symbol of our unity. And unity is so important.”
Nevertheless, reality unveils holes in the promised unity. The Weimar Triangle has good ideas, but lacks actual realization, explained an expert on German-Polish politics to Newsroom Europe Participants. One point of conflict: an European army. A year ago, Scholz categorically ruled out the deployment of German or NATO troops in Ukraine. This march, at the “Coalition of the Willing” in Paris, Macron strongly pushed for what Scholz denied: the creation of an EU-army. With the new chancellor Merz, Germany could agree on more military defense.
While Germany and France military policy collide, their partner Poland faces a pressing question: Could its army stand up to a potential Russian threat? Given Poland’s geographic and historical closeness to Ukraine, supporting their defense against Russia is a top priority. As a result, in 2024, the Polish government allocated an estimated 4.1% of their GDP to defense—making it a frontrunner within the EU.
Goodbye Weimar Triangle, hello Weimar Pentagon?
As these challenges grow, the Weimar Triangle may evolve - or be replaced. One alternative could be the so-called “Weimar +”, as mentioned in the coalition paper of the new German government. Besides the current partners, the United Kingdom and Italy would also get a seat at the table. Regarding security in the EU, Poland, the UK, and the Baltic States are already deepening military cooperation, forming a more active coalition within NATO. If France and Germany fail to align, they risk losing influence over European security decisions. However, if the nations are interested in the Weimar alliance, it could still play a role in shaping EU security policy. The question remains: will the Triangle shapeshift, or will it survive?
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